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wanton indifference to the safety of others. The courts seem
less ready to minimize contributory negligence where it is shown
that the non-turning motorist has exhibited indifference towards
the safety of others. Thus contributory negligence has been
found where, just prior to the collision, the non-turning motorist
was looking to the rear waving at a pedestrian and where he
38
was grossly exceeding a municipal speed limit.

Conclusions
The Louisiana courts, viewing the left turn as a highly dangerous maneuver, have placed a high degree of responsibility
upon a motorist turning left to "see to it" that his turn is safely
made. So onerous is this standard of care that involvement in
a collision while turning left gives rise to a presumption of fault.
In absence of a showing that the conduct of the non-turning motorist bordered on "wilful and wanton" indifference to the safety
of others, the courts tend to minimize negligence on the part of
the non-turning driver except where he was attempting to overtake at an intersection. Even then, the doctrine of last clear
chance may be available to him.
It is suggested that this approach towards left turn collisions
has developed because it is rather simple to administer and because in most cases it seems to do justice between the parties.
Evident, however, is a judicial distaste for the doctrine of contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery by a plaintiffnon-turning motorist whose standard of care is rather slight as
compared to the motorist turning left. Perhaps the courts would
prefer to compare negligence and reduce plaintiff's damages
accordingly, 39 but such is not permissible so long as the strict
doctrine of contributory negligence remains a part of Louisiana
law.
Gerald Le Van

Rights and Duties of Riders in Private Automobiles
The development of the automobile industry has not only
revolutionalized transportation, but has brought about develop37. Massicot v. Nolan, 65 So.2d 648 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953).
38. Short v. Baton Rouge, 110 So.2d 825 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959); Hardin
v. Yellow Cab Co., 38 So.2d 814 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949).
39. See Malone, Comparative Negligence -Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage,
6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 125 (1945).
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ment of a large area of tort law dealing with liability resulting
from automobile accidents. This Comment will discuss the rights
and duties of riders in private automobiles, with particular
emphasis on the automobile guest and his rights and duties in
Louisiana.'
Since no Louisiana statutory provisions have been adopted
which pertain particularly to rights and duties of riders in automobiles, 2 a consideration of general Anglo-American law on
the subject will be included. As in other areas of torts, development of the Louisiana law relative to this subject has generally
paralleled general Anglo-American law.
Duty of the Host Driver to His Guest
Generally, courts in the United States have determined the
duties of automobile drivers toward riders in their automobiles
by analogy to duties imposed upon an occupier of land toward
persons on the premises.3 Thus, the duty of an automobile driver
toward a rider in his automobile depends upon whether the
rider is classified as a business guest, a social guest or a trespasser. 4 A business guest 5 is one whose presence confers some
type of pecuniary benefit on the driver or owner, 6 such as when
a salesman drives a prospective customer for the purpose of
making a sale. 7 A gratuitous guest is one whose presence is
1. This Comment will not discuss riders on common carriers. Common carriers owe their passengers a very high degree of care. For a general discussion
of liability of carriers to riders, see BLASIHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW
AND PRACTICE §§ 2141-2224 (1946). For the Louisiana rule see Roux v. Henderson, 42 So.2d 163, 164 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949).
Also, this Comment discusses the rights and duties of the parties who play a
part in the accident. It is well to note that many of these cases are litigated
against the insurer under Louisiana's direct action statute. LA. R.S. 22:655
(1950).
2. In Louisiana, civil liability in accidents involving automobile guests is
based on the articles of the Civil Code which pertain generally to offenses and
quasi-offenses. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2315-2324 (1870). See also Jacobs v. Jacobs,
141 La. 272, 74 So. 992 (1917).
3. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 141 La. 272, 74 So. 992 (1917) ; PaossER, TORTs 450-51
(2d ed. 1955) ; Note, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 720 (1931).
4. BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 2291,
2296 (1946) ; 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 399, 401 (1949) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§490 (1934).
5. A business guest is often referred to as a "passenger." McCann v. Hoffman,
9 Cal.2d 279, 70 P.2d 909 (1937) ; Bentley v. Oldtyme Distillers, Inc., 71 N.D.
52, 298 N.W. 417 (1941) ; BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 2291 (1946) ; PROSsER, TORTS 451 (2d ed. 1955) ; 60 C.J.S. Motor
Vehicles § 399 (1949).
6. BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2291
(1946); PRossFi, TORTS 451 (2d ed. 1955) ; 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 399
(1949).
7. George v. Stanfield, 33 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Idaho 1940); Fachadio v.
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not primarily for the purpose of conferring a pecuniary benefit
on the driver or owner." Sharing expenses of a trip9 or assisting in driving' are not of themselves benefits which will take
one out of the gratuitious guest category." A trespasser is one
who is riding without express or implied consent of the owner
2
or driver.
A driver owes a duty of ordinary care to business and
gratuitous guests riding in his vehicle. 13 For the benefit of a
business guest, a driver has the duty of inspecting his vehicle
in order to warn the guest of safety defects which a reasonable
inspection would reveal.' 4 Reasonableness of an inspection depends upon the circumstances of each case considering such
factors as the mechanical skill or aptitude of the driver in question.' 5 On the other hand, for the gratuitous guest the driver
is not required to make an inspection in order to ascertain
defects in his driving or in the automobile. The driver is required only to warn the guest of those defects of which the
driver has actual knowledge.' 6 Defects for which the driver
Krovitz, 62 Cal. App. 2d 362, 144 P.2d 646 (1944) (riding with driver for purpose of helping driver obtain employment) ; Sullivan v. Richardson, 119 Cal. App.
367, 6 P.2d 567 (1931) (prospective purchaser riding with representative of
development company to realty development) ; Palmer v. Miller, 310 Ill. App.
582, 35 N.E.2d 104 (1941) (rider serving as trained nurse for driver) ; Brown
v. Wood, 293 Mich. 148, 291 N.W. 255, 127 A.L.R. 1436 (1940) (rider paying
driver to chauffeur him); Anderson v. Conterio, 303 Mich. 75, 5 N.W.2d 572
(1942).
8. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 490 (1934) ; 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 399 (1949).
9. Squyres v. Baldwin, 191 La. 249, 185 So. 14 (1938) ; Askowith v. Massell,
260 Mass. 202, 156 N.E. 875 (1927).
10. Dible v. Harper's Estate, 294 Mich. 453, 293 N.W. 715 (1940).
11. Morales v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 202 La. 755, 12 So.2d
804 (1943) (riding in rear of ambulance with daughter) ; Neuman v. Eddy, 15
La. App. 45, 130 So. 247 (1st Cir. 1930) (buying breakfast for driver) ; Ruel
v. Langelier, 299 Mass. 240, 12 N.E.2d 735 (1938) (helping driver to get the
car started) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 490 (1934).
12. Lipscomb v. News Star World Pub. Corp., 5 So.2d 41 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1941) ; Spence v. Browning Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 138 W. Va. 748, 77 S.E.2d
806 (1953) ; BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2296
(1946).
13. Beard v. Klusmeier, 158 Ky. 153, 164 S.W. 319 (1914); Morales v.
Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 202 La. 755, 12 So.2d 804 (1943) ; Jacobs
v. Jacobs, 141 La. 272, 74' So. 992 (1917) ; Aden v. Allen, 3 So.2d 905 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1941) ; Galbraith v. Dreyfus, 162 So. 246 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935)
Lynghaug v. Payte, 247 Minn. 186, 76 N.W.2d 660, 56 A.L.R.2d 1090 (1956)
Waters v. Markham, 204 Wis. 332, 235 N.W. 797 (1931) ; BLASIIFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 2311, 2233 (1946) ; PROSSER, TORTS
447-48, 451, 459 (2d ed. 1955) ; Gammon, The Automobile Guest, 17 TENN. L.
REV. 452 (1942) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 342-343 (1934) ; 60 C.J.S. Motor
Vehicles §§ 399, 403 (1949).
14. PROSSER, TORTS 459 (2d ed. 1955) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 343 (1934).
15. BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2272
(1946) ; PROSSF,

TORTS 459 (2d ed. 1955).

16. Lynghaug v. Payte, 247 Minn. 186, 76 N.W.2d 660, 56 A.L.R.2d 1090
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must inspect or of which he must give notice include deficiencies or conditions in himself which would make him an unsafe
driver as well as mechanical conditions which would make the
automobile unsafe to operate.' 7 To a trespassser in or on his
vehicle, a driver is liable only for wilful or wanton negligence.
Some courts have held that when statutes require certain
parts of the automobile to be maintained in safe mechanical
condition, the host driver is responsible to a rider for failure
to meet the statutory requirements. This result has been reached
even in cases involving gratuitious guests. For example, if a
statute requires that mufflers be maintained in a manner so
as to prevent carbon monoxide from entering the cab of the
automobile, the host driver is under a duty to make certain
that such maintenance as required by the statute is performed. 8
It would seem that statutes requiring periodic inspections, such
as that in Louisiana, 9 are designed in part to protect both
business and gratuitous guests. Failure of a driver to comply
with such statute should establish at least a rebuttable presump20
tion of breach of duty on his part.
Some jurisdictions have enacted "guest statutes" which provide that the host driver is liable to the gratuitous guest only
for acts of wilful or wanton negligence. 21 These statutes are justified on the basis that host drivers should not be held responsible
for acts of simple negligence while gratuitously furnishing
transportation to the guest. They prevent recovery by hitch
hikers for acts of simple negligence on the part of the driver,
they reduce litigation, and they reduce automobile insurance
claims and rates. 22 A few jurisdictions have judicially estab(1956) ; Coppedge v. Blackburn, 15 Tenn. App. 587 (1932) ; BLASHFIELD, CYCLO§ 2333 (1946) ; PROSSEE, TORTS 451
(2d ed. 1955).
17. See note 16 supra.
18. Lynghaug v. Payte, 247 Minn. 186, 76 N.W.2d 660, 56 A.L.R.2d 1090
(1956) ; Harper v. Wilson, 163 Miss. 199, 140 So. 693 (1932) ; BLASHFIELD,
CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2333 (1946).
19. LA. R.S. 32:1301-1310 (1950).
20. Knowingly riding in an automobile without an inspection sticker could
be construed as assumption of risk or contributory negligence on the part of the

PEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE

guest.

21. For examples of these "guest statutes," see MALCOLM, AUTOMOBILE GUEST
265-94, § 5 (1937). Louisiana does not have a "guest statute."
22. Crawford v. Foster, 110 Cal. App. 81, 293 Pac. 841 (1930) ("dog that
bites the hand that feeds him" theory) ; BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 2292 (1946) ; MALCOLM, AUTOMOBILE GUEST LAW § § 3-4
(1937) ; PROSSER, TORTS 451-52 (2d ed. 1955) ; Cornish, The Automobile Guest,
14 B.U.L. REV. 728, 750 (1934) ; Gammon, The Automobile Guest, 17 TENN. L.
REV. 452, 458 (1942) ; Note, 5 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 488 (1943).
STATUTES
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lished a rule similar to that provided by "guest statutes" by
dividing automobile guests into two categories- invitees and
licensees. An invitee is one who is present in the automobile
at the request of the driver, while a licensee is present at his
own request. The host driver owes the invitee the duty of exercising ordinary care, while he owes the licensee only the duty
23
of not performing acts of wilful or wanton negligence.
The leading Louisiana case on automobile guest law has
strongly indicated that the common law rules pertaining to
liability of occupiers of land are applicable to automobile guests
in Louisiana. 24 However, the Louisiana courts have not distinguished between the business guest and the gratuitous guest
because they have never been squarely faced with the problem
of what duty the driver owes to a guest in regard to an inspection of the automobile. One case has implied that the driver
25
does not owe any guest the duty to inspect the automobile,
while another case has indicated that the driver owes all guests
the duty of making a reasonable inspection. 26 As the Louisiana
courts have applied the land law in the past, it would seem that
they would draw a distinction between the duties owed business
and gratuitous guests.
Effect of Guest's Participationin the Accident in Suits Between
the Guest and a Driver of Another Automobile
The duty of drivers toward guests or riders in other automobiles is merely to exercise reasonable care. 27 Classification
23. BLASHFIELD,

CYCLOPEDIA

OF AUTOMOBILE

LAW

AND

PRACTICE

§§ 2294-

2295, 2312 (1946); Gammon, The Automobile Guest, 17 TENN. L. REV. 452
(1942).
24. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 141 La. 272, 74 So. 992 (1917).
25. Sears v. Interurban Transportation Co., 14 La. App. 343, 125 So. 748

(2d Cir. 1930).
26. Christos v. Manos, 16 La. App. 512, 134 So. 713 (Orl. Cir. 1931).
27. Derouen v. American Employers Insurance Co., 240 La. 486, 123 So.2d
896 (1960) ; Vowell v. Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Co., 229 La. 798, 86

So.2d 909 (1956) ; Herget v. Saucier, 223 La. 938, 67 So.2d 543 (1953) ; White
v. State Farm Casualty Insurance Co., 222 La. 994, 64 So.2d 245 (1953) Vitale
v. Checker Cab Co., 166 La. 527, 117 So. 579 (1928); Churchill v. Texas &
Pacific Ry., 151 La. 726, 92 So. 314 (1922) ; Brady v. Audubon Insurance Co.,
114 So.2d 659 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959) ; Murphy v. Rowan, 84 So.2d 743 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1956) ; Fried v. Dabria, 78 So.2d 844 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955) ;
Jones v. Farris, 77 So.2d 736 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955) ; Taormina v. Reid, 71
So.2d 351 (La. App. Or. Cir. 1954) ; Abbott v. Landry, 46 So.2d 338 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1950) ; Stuart v. Gleason & McKenney, 42 So.2d 545 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1949) ; Carter v. LeBlanc Lumber Co., 37 So.2d 471 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948) ;

Cassar v. Mansfield Lumber Co., 35 So.2d 797 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948) ; Coffey
v. Lalanne, 20 So.2d 614 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945) ; Cooper v. Garrett, 6 So.2d
209 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942) ; Wagner v. Susslin, 4 So.2d 624 (La. App. Orl.
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of a rider as a business guest, social guest, or trespasser is
immaterial. However, the doctrines or principles which may
be used as a defense by the driver of another vehicle are more
complicated and frequently arise in litigation.
Usually, when a driver of another vehicle negligently injures an automobile guest, the driver will attempt to bar recovery by the guest on the grounds that the guest was contributorily negligent. In the absence of a master-servant relationship,
the mere fact that a host driver is negligent does not make a
rider in his vehicle contributorily negligent as to a driver of
another vehicle. There must be a finding of some independent
negligence on the part of the guest himself before he can be
28
held to be contributorily negligent.
A guest who encourages excessive speed or reckless driving
is considered as engaging in an independent act of negligence
and thus is deemed to be contributorily negligent. 29 Also, a guest
may be held contributorily negligent for failing to protest to
his host driver when he has reason to believe that the host driver
is operating the automobile in a negligent manner. 30 In some
situations, if it will not worsen his position, the guest may be
required to get out of the automobile if he has the opportunity
or at least request that the driver stop and let him out.8 1 The
Cir. 1941); Bailey v. Demourelle, 135 So. 623 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1931) ; Alost V.
J. Moock Wood & Drayage Co., 120 So. 791 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929) ; BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2516 (1946) ; PROSSER,
TORTS 5 (2d ed. 1955).
28. Aaron v. Martin, 188 La. 371, 177 So. 242 (1937); Vitale v. Checker
Cab Co., 166 La. 527, 117 So. 579 (1928) ; Jacobs v. Jacobs, 141 La. 272, 74 So.
992 (1917); Vidrine v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 105 So.2d
279 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958) ; Fried v. Dabria, 78 So.2d 844 (La. App. Orl.
Cir 1955) ; Rodriguez v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 88 So.2d 432 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1955); Fetterly v. McNeely, 77 So.2d 757 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1955) ; Brown v. Dalton, 143 So. 672 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1932) ; HARPER &
JAMES, TORTS § 23.2 (1956).
29. Solomon v. Davis Bus Line, 1 So.2d 816 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941) ; BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2431 (1946).
30. Wilson v. Harrell, 87 Ga. App. 793, 75 S.E.2d 436 (1953) ; Hubbard v.
Bartholomew, 163 Iowa 58, 144 N.W. 13 (1913) ; Vowell v. Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Co., 229 La. 798, 86 So.2d 909 (1956) ; Delaune v. Breaux, 174
La. 43, 139 So. 753 (1932) ; Sambola v. Public Belt R.R. Comm., 56 So.2d 267
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1952) ; Singley v. Thomas, 49 So.2d 465 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1950) ; Albright v. Tatum, 37 So.2d 888 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948); Cassar v.
Mansfield Lumber Co., 35 So.2d 797 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948) ; Barr v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co., 188 So. 521 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939) ; Gray v. Southern Auto
Wreckers, Inc., 166 So. 154 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936) ; Mansur v. Abraham, 164
So,. 418 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1935) ; Lopez v. O'Keefe, 158 So. 36 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1934) ;.Chanson v. Morgan's Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co., 18 La. App. 602,
136 So. 647 (1st Cir. 1931) ; BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 2414 (1946).
31. Wilson v. Harrell, 87 Ga. App. 793, 75 S.E.2d 436 (1953) ; Brown v. Hill,
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guest may not sit idly by and disregard dangers which he knows
are detrimental to his safety. He must warn the driver of those
dangers of which he has or should have knowledge when he
knows or has reason to know that the driver does not have
32
knowledge of them.
A guest is not required to exercise as high a degree of care

as the driver. Generally an automobile guest may rely upon the
driver for safe transportation and is not negligent if he engages in such activities as sleeping,3 talking to other occu-

pants,3 4 or reading.3 5 He need not continually watch the road
and point out any possible danger. In fact, the law generally
frowns on "back seat driving," as it is distracting to the driver.3 8

This does not mean that the guest must leave the driver in
complete solitude; engaging in conversation with the driver is
3 7
not necessarily contributory negligence.

Another method utilized by negligent drivers of other automobiles to bar recovery by automobile guests is the joint enter-

prise doctrine.88 This doctrine is to the effect that when an

automobile driver and rider have a common interest in reaching
their destination and each has a mutual right to control management of the automobile, each is responsible for the negligence
228 S.C. 34, 88 S.E.2d 838 (1955) ; Webb v. Karstein, 308 S.W.2d 114 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1957) ; BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 2415 (1946).
32. Herget v. Saucier, 223 La. 938, 67 So.2d 543 (1953) ; Aaron v. Martin,
188 La. 371, 177 So. 242 (1937) ; Delaune v. Breaux, 174 La. 43, 139 So. 753
(1932) ; Cassar v. Mansfield Lumber Co., 35 So.2d 797 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948) ;
Barr v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 188 So. 521 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939) ; Martin
v. Yazoo & M. R.R., 181 So. 571 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938) ; Lopez v. O'Keefe,
158 So. 36 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1934) ; Chanson v. Morgan's Louisiana & T.R.
& S.S. Co., 18 La. App. 602, 136 So. 647 (1st Cir. 1931) ; Larson v. MissouriKansas-Texas R.R., 254 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); BLASHFIELD,
CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2413 (1946) ; PROSSER, TORTS
300 (2d ed. 1955).
33. Murphy v. Rowan, 84 So.2d 743 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1956) ; Weddle v.
Phelan, 177 So. 407 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937) ; Lea v. Gentry, 167 Tenn. 664,

73 S.W.2d 170 (1934);

§ 2432

BLASHFIELD,

CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE

LAW AND

(1946).
34. Theriot v. Tassin, 146 So. 729 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933) ; Hyman v. Salzer
Plumbing Co., 135 So. 703 (La. App. Or]. Cir. 1931).
35. Singley v. Thomas, 49 So.2d 465 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950).
36. Taormina v. Reid, 71 So.2d 351 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954) ; Cassar v.
Mansfield Lumber Co., 35 So.2d 797 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948) ; Alost v. J. Moock
Wood & Drayage Co., 10 La. App. 57, 120 So. 791 (Or. Cir. 1929) ; BLASHFIELD,
CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2431 (1946).
37. McLehaney v. Great American Indemnity Co., 116 So.2d 69 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1959) ; Sweeney v. New Orleans Public Service, 184 So. 740 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1938); BLASIIFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 2431 (1946). But of. Waddell v. Langlois, 158 So. 665 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1935) ; Campbell v. Campbell, 316 Pa. 331, 175 Atl. 407 (1934).
38. This doctrine is also called "joint venture" or "common venture."
PRACTICE
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of the other. 39 Thus, if a driver and a guest are riding in an
automobile pursuant to a certain agreement between the two,
such as where they have rented an automobile together in order
to take a trip to a certain location, they are considered to be
engaged in a joint enterprise. In this situation, each will be
responsible for the negligent acts of the other. 40 Therefore,
negligence of the one driving at the time of an accident will
preclude the other from recovering against the negligent driver
of another vehicle.
Since on most trips there is a common destination, this element of joint enterprise has not been extensively litigated. The
problem in most joint enterprise cases is in determining whether
or not the guest had a right to control the management of the
automobile. In order to control the management of the automobile, it is not necessary to maintain actual physical control
over the driver. It is sufficient if each party has the right to
have his wishes respected in the operation, management, and
destination of the automobile. 41 Whether one has this right to
control or not is generally a question of fact which must be
decided on the circumstances of each case. An equal right to
control has been held to have existed where the driver and guest
borrowed an automobile 42 or where they both owned the automobile.4 On the other hand, right to control has been held
not to have existed where the driver and guest were going to
a dance, 44 an athletic event, 45 visiting friends, 46 or riding in a
car pool.4 7 The situation in Louisiana is in accord with the
39. Squyres v. Baldwin, 191 La. 249, 185 So. 14 (1938) ; Lorance v. Smith,
173 La. 883, 138 So. 871 (1931) ; Lawrason v. Richard, 172 La. 696, 135 So.
29 (1931); Bordelon v. Couvillion, 130 So.2d 453 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961)
Hawkins v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 73 So.2d 348 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954)
Singley v. Thomas, 49 So.2d 465 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950) ; Waguespack v.
Savarese, 13 So.2d 726 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1943); Gott v. Scott, 199 So. 460
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1940); Kimbro v. Holladay, 154 So. 369 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1934) ; Chanson v. Morgan's Louisiana & Texas R.R. & S.S. Co., 18 La. App.
602, 136 So. 647 (1st Cir. 1931) ; BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW
AND PRACTICE § 2294 (1946) ; HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 26.13 (1956) ; PROSSER,
TORTS 363, 365-66 (2d ed. 1955) ; 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 168 (1950).
40. HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 26.13 (1956).
41. BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE' § 2494
(1946) ; PROSSER, TORTS 365-66 (2d ed. 1955).
42. See McLaughlin v. Pittsburgh Rys., 252 Pa. 32, 97 Atl. 107 (1916).
43. Tennehill v. Kansas City, C. & S. Ry., 279 Mo. 138, 213 S.W. 818
(1919).
44. Hudson v. Yellow Cab & Baggage Co., 145 Kan. 66, 64 P.2d 43 (1937).
45. Capital Transportation Co. v. Compton, 187 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1951).
46. Cornelius v. Fields, 122 So.2d 704 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) ; Lawson v.
Nossek, 130 So. 669 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1930).
47. Shockman v. Union Transfer Co., 220 Minn. 334, 19 N.W.2d 812 (1945).
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general view, except that the Louisiana courts seem more cautious in finding a right to control the automobile. 48
Another method by which a negligent driver of another
automobile may bar recovery by a guest is by showing that
there was a master-servant relationship existing between the
driver and the guest. In such situations negligence of the driverservant will be imputed to the master-guest, thereby barring
recovery against a third party.49 Such a master-servant relationship arises where the guest has a right to control the operation
of the vehicle. Thus, it has been held that when a father is
riding in his automobile while permitting his son to drive5" or
when a lady allows her escort to drive her automobile while she
sits beside him, 51 the rider has made the driver his agent for
purposes of operating the automobile and the driver's negligence

is imputed to the rider.5 2 The mere existence of a family relationship will not establish a master-servant relationship. 53 However,
48. Squyres v. Baldwin, 191 La. 249, 185 So. 14 (1938) (rider paying expenses of trip) ; Delaune v. Breaux, 174 La. 43, 139 So. 753 (1932) (driver and
rider as co-owners of bottle of gin drinking it on pleasure trip) ; Lorance v. Smith,
173 La. 883, 138 So. 871 (1931) (riding to picture show) ; Lawrason v. Richard,
172 La. 696, 135 So. 29 (1931) (riding to fraternity initiation) ; Vitale v. Checker
Cab Co., 166 La. 527, 117 So. 579 (1928) (husband and wife riding together)
Cornelius v. Fields, 122 So.2d 704 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) (visiting friends)
Benson v. Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co., 79 So.2d 345 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1955) (riding to baseball game) ; Hubble v. Bourg, 68 So.2d 639 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1953) (riding with brother)
Jones v. Burke, 51 So.2d 322 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1951) (two ministers returning daughter of one of ministers from hospital) ;
Singley v. Thomas, 49 So.2d 465 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950) (riding on trip with
son) ; Russo v. Aucoin, 7 So.2d 744 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942) (employees going
on pleasure ride on lunch hour) ; Prudhomme v. Continental Casualty Co., 169
So. 147 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936) (auto salesman riding from call on prospective
customer); Rhodes v. Jordan, 157 So. 811 (La. App. 8d Cir. 1934) (riding
with deputy sheriff to show deputy a still) ; Ponder v. Ponder, 157 So. 627 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1934) (daughter riding with parents to football game) ; Richard v.
Roquevert, 148 So. 92 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1933) (attorney and client's son-in-law
riding on client's business) ; Denham v. Taylor, 131 So. 614 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1930) (rider and driver going dancing) ; Neuman v. Eddy, 130 So. 247 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1930) (buying breakfast for driver).
49. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2320 (1870) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 243
(1957).
50. Slocum v. Hawn, 155 So. 24 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934).
51. Riggs v. F. Strauss & Son, 2 So.2d 501 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941).
52. BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2498
(1946).
53. Vitale v. Checker Cab Co., 166 La. 527, 117 So. 579 (1928) ; McLehaney
v. Great American Indemnity Co., 116 So.2d 69 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959) ; Benoit
v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co., 79 So.2d 647 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955) ;
Cassar v. Mansfield Lumber Co., 35 So.2d 797 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948) ; Giorlando v. Maitrejean, 22 So.2d 564 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1945). See also Hubble v.
Bourg, 68 So.2d 639 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953) (brother and sister); Weitkam
v. Johnston, 5 So.2d 582 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942) (mother and daughter) ; Horn
v. Barras, 172 So. 451 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937) (rider riding with brother)
Driefus v. Levy, 140 So. 259 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932) (rider riding with sister)
BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTrOMOmBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2496 (1946).
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when the husband is present in the family automobile, he is
generally deemed to have the right to control its operation
whether he is driving or not.5 4 Although an owner may be classified as a guest in his automobile, he is usually presumed to
have the right to control and will be barred from recovery from
another negligent driver when his driver is contributorily negligent.5 5 In Louisiana, the mere theoretical right to control the
automobile will establish a master-servant relationship, 56 even
57
where the owner is sleeping while riding in the automobile.
In Louisiana, as elsewhere, the driver of another automobile
may not invoke the doctrine of assumption of risk to bar recovery by an automobile guest. When a guest assumes certain
risks by riding with the host driver, he generally assumes only
those risks incidental to riding with the host driver. He does
not ordinarily assume the risk of being injured by the negligent
acts of third parties. 58
Under some circumstances a driver of another automobile
may recover from an automobile rider. If a negligent host driver
is the agent of the rider, the driver of another automobile may
recover from the rider since the negligence of the host driver
is imputed to the rider.5 9 In a few cases the rider has been held
liable to a driver of another automobile when a joint enterprise
existed between the host driver and the rider. 0 No cases were
found in Louisiana which allowed recovery by a driver of another automobiles on the basis of joint enterprise, although at
least one case has implied that this may be possible. 6 1 It would
seem that the doctrine should apply equally in both situations.
However, Louisiana, like other jurisdictions, has been concerned
54. Pierrotti v. Huff Truck Lines, 63 So.2d 886 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953)
Welch v. Louisiana Oil Refining Corp., 135 So. 617 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1931).

55.

PROSSER, TORTS

368 (2d ed. 1955).

56. Rodriguez v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 88 So.2d 432 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1955) ; Pierrotti v. Huff Truck Lines, 63 So.2d 886 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1953) ; McCook v. Rebecca-Fabacher, Inc., 10 So.2d 512 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942);
Horn v. Barras, 172 So. 451 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937).
57. Riggs v. F. Strauss & Son, 2 So.2d 501 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941).
58. Note, 22 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 275 (1961) ; see discussion of assumption of risk infra. See also note 71 infra.
59. See discussion of imputed negligence because of a master-servant relationship between driver and rider, supra p. 480.
60. Crescent Motor Co. v. Stone, 211 Ala. 516, 101 So. 49 (1924) ; Strauffus
v. Barclay, 147 Tex. 600, 219 S.W.2d 65 (1949) ; HRPER.a & JAMES, TORTS § 26.13
(1956); PROSSR, TORTS 363-64 (2d ed. 1955); Note, 1 BAYLOR L. REv. 492
(1949).
61. Buquet v. St. Amant, 55 So.2d 645 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951) ; Note, 12
LOUISIANA LAW

Ravixw 323 (1952).
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with the joint enterprise doctrine mainly as a defense rather
than as a basis for recovery.
In the absence of any master-servant relationship or joint
enterprise, there are few cases holding a guest liable for injuries to drivers of other automobiles. The duty of the guest
generally is to exercise reasonable care for his own safety. If
a guest does not exercise such care, his negligence may bar recovery for himself, but he will not be held liable to third
62

persons.

Effect of Guest's Participationin the Accident in Suits Against
his Host Driver
In suits by the guest against his host driver, the doctrines
of joint enterprise and respondeat superior as discussed above
are not available defenses to the host. An agency relationship
exists in both of these situations and the master and servant
are liable to each other for personal negligence under the same
circumstances in which each would be liable to a third person.6
However, the guest's recovery may be barred by both the doctrine of assumption of risk and contributory negligence. Most
jurisdictions, including Louisiana, require three elements in
order to constitute assumption of risk: (1) a hazard to the
safety of the guest, (2) knowledge and appreciation of the
hazard by the guest, and (3) acquiescence or a willingness to
proceed in the face of danger. 4 Thus, if a guest knowingly and
voluntarily rides with an intoxicated6 5 or incompetent 0 driver
62. Russo v. Aucoin, 7 So.2d 744 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942) ; James v. Rivet,
133 So. 448 (La. App. Or]. Cir. 1931) ; BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE

§ 3131 (1954).
63. Lawrason v. Richard, 172 La. 696, 135 So. 29 (1931); PROSSER, TORTS
367 (2d ed. 1955) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 470 (1957).
64. Constantin v. Bankers Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 129 So.2d 269 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1961) ; Knipfer v. Shaw, 210 Wis. 617, 246 N.W. 328 (1933);
BLASHFIELD,
CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 2511-2516
(1946) ; HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §§ 21.1-21.8 (1956) ; PROSSER, TORTS 303-14
(2d ed. 1955) ; 61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 486 (1949).
65. White v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 222 La. 994, 64 So.2d 245
(1953) ; Otis v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 127 So.2d 197 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1961) ; Cormier v. Angelle, 119 So.2d 876 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) ; Woods
v. King, 115 So.2d 232 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959) ; Elba v. Thomas, 59 So.2d 732
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1952) ; Bogen v. Bogen, 220 N.C. 648, 18 S.E.2d 162 (1942) ;
Gilbertson v. Gmeinder, 252 Wis. 210, 31 N.W.2d 160 (1948) ; BLASHFIELD,
CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2512 (1946) ; Note, 22 LOuISILAW AND PRACTICE

ANA LAW REVmW 275 (1961).

66. White v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 222 La. 994, 64 So.2d 245
(1953) (riding with incompetent driver) ; Troquille v. American Universal Insurance Co., 127 So.2d 590 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) (inexperienced unlicensed
driver) ; Livaudais v. Black, 127 So. 129 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930) (driver suf-
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or in a defective automobile, 67 the guest is held to assume the
risk of any injuries incurred as a result of the defect in the
driver or the automobile. On the other hand, if the guest does
not know of a condition indicating that the driver may not be
able to operate the automobile safely,6 8 or the defect in the automobile,6 9 or does not voluntarily ride with the driver, 70 he is
not held to assume the risk.
A guest is not considered as assuming the risk of every
possible injury which may occur. He only assumes those risks
which are incidental to the danger to which he has exposed
himself. For example, if the guest is riding on the fender of
an automobile with a competent driver, he only assumes those
risks incidental to riding on the fender, such as falling off the
fender. He does not assume the risk of injuries brought about
by the negligence of the host driver or the driver of another
vehicle. 71
A guest may assume the risk of injury when he knows that
the driver is negligent or incompetent. If prior to entering the
automobile the guest does not know that the driver is prone to
negligence or is incompetent but later discovers this and fails
to protest, he may be held to have acquiesced in the negligent
fered periodic spells of temporary blindness) ; Miller v. Flashner, 190 N.Y. Supp.
2d 420 (1959) (sleepy driver).
67. Sloan v. Gulf Refining Co., 139 So. 26 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1924) (no
lights) ; Branch v. Bug Ride, Inc., 63 N.Y. Supp. 2d 409 (1946) (defective steering apparatus); BLASIFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 2515 (1946).
68. Constantin v. Bankers Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 129 So.2d 269
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) (guest did not know that driver had no license) ; Dowden
v. Bankers Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 124 So.2d 254 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960)
(guest had no knowledge of intoxication of driver) ; Warner v. Home Indemnity
Co., 123 So.2d 518 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1960) (guest did not know that drinking
had affected host's driving) ; Upshaw v. Great American Indemnity Co., 112 So.2d
125 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959) (guest did not know that host's fatigue was affecting his driving) ; BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 2512 (1946).
69. Woodward v. Tillman, 82 So.2d 121 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955) (defective
brakes) ; Monsour v. Farris, 181 Miss. 803, 181 So. 326 (1938) (worn tires).
70. Clinton v. City of West Monroe, 187 So. 561 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939)
(rider had passed out from drinking and was thrown into driver's automobile).
71. Keowen v. Amite Sand & Gravel Co., 4 So.2d 79 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941).
See also Jackson v. Young, 99 So.2d 400 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957) (guest sitting
on side of truck did not assume risk of driver's reckless driving) ; Elliott v. Coreil,
158 So. 698 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1935) (guest sitting in box seat in rear of automobile did not assume risk of negligent driving by third party) ; McDonald v. Stellwagon, 140 So. 133 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932) (boy scouts riding on running board
did not assume risk of scoutmaster's reckless driving) ; Stout v. Lewis, 15 La.
App. 207, 123 So. 346 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929) (guest riding on running board
did not assume risk of recklessness of driver) ; BLASEWIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2511 (1946).
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driving and thereby assumed the risk of such driving. 72 Also,
when the guest has the opportunity to leave or request to leave
the automobile without worsening his position and does not do
so, he may be held to have assumed the risk of the faulty
driving. 8
A guest who is contributorily negligent cannot recover from
a host driver. Some courts, including those of Louisiana, consider the doctrine of assumption of risk as a type of contributory negligence. 74 A guest will be considered contributorily negligent if he fails to take affirmative action when he knows or
should know that the host driver is 'operating the automobile
negligently. Contributory negligence would also bar recovery
against a host driver where the guest knows or should know
of a danger and he knows or should know that the driver is not
aware of it.
The distinction between contributory negligence and assumption of risk seems to be that actual knowledge and appreciation
of the danger is necessary for assumption of risk, whereas these
requirements are not necessary for contributory negligence.7 5
The distinction is important whenever a host driver's negligence
may be classified as wilful and wanton because assumption of
risk is a defense to wilful and wanton negligence, whereas contributory neligence is not. 70 In all cases not involving wilful
or wanton negligence, the same result would be obtained whether
a guest's conduct is considered an assumption of risk or contributory negligence.
Conduct amounting to contributory negligence on the part
of a plaintiff guest does not necessarily make him liable if he
72. See Pipes v. Gallman, 173 La. 158, 136 So. 302 (1931)

(acquiescence in

speeding) ; Bordelon v. Couvillion, 130 So.2d 453 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) (guest
voluntarily rode in drag race) ; David v. Joseph, 164 So. 467 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1935) (acquiescence in speeding) ; BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOJBILE LAW
AND PRACTICE § 2512 (1946).
73. Curley v. Mahan, 288 Mass. 369, 193 N.E. 34 (1934) (failure of rider to
discontinue journey when the driver had stopped for five minutes when he knew
that driver was driving at excessive speed) ; BLASIIFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2512 (1946).
74. Pipes v. Gallman, 174 La. 265, 140 So. 43 (1932) ; Pipes v. Gallman, 173

La. 158, 136 So. 302 (1931) ; Bordelon v. Couvillion, 130 So.2d 453 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1961) ; Otis v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 127 So.2d 197 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1961) ; Mercier v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 10 So.2d 262 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1942) ; Stout v. Lewis, 15 La. App. 207, 123 So. 346 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1929); BLASIIFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2511
(1946) ; PROSSER, TORTS 304 (2d ed. 1955).

75. PROSSER, TORTS 309-10 (2d ed. 1955).
76. Russell v. Turner, 56 F. Supp. 455 (N.D. Iowa 1944) ; Freedman v. Hurwitz, 116 Conn. 283, 164 Atl. 647 (1933) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 482 (1934).
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is a defendant. It would take an extremely rare factual situation to allow such recovery by a host driver because in most
cases the host driver would be contributorily negligent. For
example, if an automobile accident resulted because the guest
was diverting the driver's attention, the driver, by allowing his
attention to be diverted, would probably be held contributorily
negligent. No cases were found on this subject.
Conclusion
Although there are a few areas in need of clarification, the
Louisiana rules pertaining to riders in automobiles are generally
well settled. The Louisiana courts have adopted the rules of
the majority of general Anglo-American jurisdictions in most
instances. It would seem that the major task in this area is
applying factual situations to the rules which have been formulated by the courts. It is hoped that this Comment will be of
assistance in this process.
Frank F. Foil

Significance of the Youthfulness of a Party in
Louisiana Automobile Accident Cases
With the great number of children daily exposed to the
hazards of modern automobile traffic, the question of the effect
which their youth plays on the liability of the injuring motorist
becomes increasingly important. This Comment will consider
the effect of the victim's youth on the liability of the motorist
who injures a youthful pedestrian, bicyclist, or automobile
driver. More specifically, the duties imposed on the motorist
and the availability of contributory negligence of the victim
will be discussed. At the outset it is also important to note that
although frequently language in the opinions use terms such as
"highest degree of care," "extreme care," and "unusual care
and caution" the significant inquiry in each situation is to determine if the particular motorist exercised reasonable care
under the circumstances. Therefore, although a motorist must
certainly exercise more caution when approaching a very young
child than when confronted with an adult, and courts often use
language such as "highest degree of care" to stress this fact;

